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ABSTRACT
There is rapidly  growing interest in the use of market-based  (MB) instruments  in environ-
mental  policy.  The  papers  in this  session  discuss three  relatively  new  areas for  such pol-
icies:  groundwater  contamination,  nonpoint source  surface-water  pollution  and carbon  se-
questration.  The  papers  point  out  the  potential  for  MB  policies  in  these  areas,  but
significant  challenges  remain.  This  comment  highlights  challenges  related to  five  issues:
monitoring  and enforcement,  trading  ratios,  baselines,  transaction  costs,  and risk  and un-
certainty.  All  these  issues  must  be  addressed  before  MB  policies  can  take  the  full  step
from  economic  theory  to regulatory  reality.
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Once viewed as only  a pipe dream of academ-
ic  economists,  the  trading  of  environmental
flows  is  being  increasingly  sought  by  policy
makers  to  address  a  wide  range  of issues.  In
addition  to  the  well-known  SO2 market  that
was set up by the 1990 Clean Air Act, markets
for other air pollutants  are  active in numerous
states,  wetlands  mitigation  banks  are  being
widely  used,  and  international  CO2 trading
was  written  into  the  Kyoto  Protocol  on  Cli-
mate  Change.  The  idea  is  catching  on,  and
policy makers  and economists  alike are begin-
ning  to look  at  virtually every  environmental
problem and  asking,  "Can  trading be used to
solve  this problem?"
The papers presented in this session discuss
the potential  for market-based  (MB)  environ-
Richard  T. Woodward  is  an  assistant  professor  in  the
Department  of Agricultural  Economics  at Texas A&M
University.
This  research  was  conducted  by  the  Texas  Agri-
cultural  Experiment  Station,  Texas  A&M  University
System.
mental policies  in three  arenas  in which there
has been little  or no  experience with MB pol-
icies.  Randall and Taylor look primarily at the
potential  for  these  policies  to  address  prob-
lems of surface water pollution from nonpoint
sources.  Zeuli  and Skees  consider  how  a  na-
tional  market  for  carbon  sequestration  might
affect  southern  agriculture.  Finally,  Morgan,
Coggins  and Eidman discuss how they plan to
study  the  potential  application  of  a  MB  ap-
proach for addressing contamination of under-
ground aquifers.
The  challenges  faced in each  of these new
venues  are  perhaps  most easily  seen  by con-
trasting  them with  the issues  where MB  pro-
grams have  been  so  successful-air pollution
from point sources.  First, there is the issue of
dispersion.  In  the  most  simplistic  economic
models of MB  programs  we typically  assume
that  the pollutant  is uniformly  mixed  so that
the damage  caused by  a  pollutant is  indepen-
dent  of its  source.  While  even  air  pollutants
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tive impacts  from air pollution  are,  relatively,
quite  evenly  dispersed  over  large  areas.  Sec-
ond,  there  are  the  issues  of  monitoring  and
enforcement.  By  definition,  we  can  point  to
the  pollution  that  is  generated  by  a  point
source.  If Firm A  says  that it has  reduced  its
pollution,  this  can  be  verified  by  monitoring
the  output  from  Smokestack  A.  Because  of
these  characteristics,  regulatory agencies  have
been relatively  comfortable  with the  adoption
of markets to  address  air pollution problems.
These  two  characteristics  that  have  made
MB  initiatives in air pollution markets  so suc-
cessful are  sorely  lacking  in each  of the prob-
lems  considered  in the papers  presented  here.
For  both  of the papers  addressing  water  pol-
lution issues, the pollutants are clearly not uni-
formly  mixed.  As  Randall  and  Taylor  put  it,
for  water  pollution  policies,  "the  immutable
fact that water tends to flow downhill provides
an enduring  organizing principle."  On the oth-
er  hand,  this  is  not  an  issue  for  Zeuli  and
Skees  since  global  climate  changes  is  one  of
the few environmental problems  for which the
externality  is truly uniformly  mixed. The three
papers  have  in  common  the  fact  that  the  en-
vironmental  flow  of interest cannot be readily
quantified.  Even with  thorough and costly sci-
entific study it would be impossible to identify
exactly  how  much pollutants  leave  a farmer's
land or how  much carbon  is sequestered.
The implementation  of MB programs in the
areas  considered  in  these  papers  must,  there-
fore,  overcome  the numerous  challenges  that
arise  because  of  problems  of  nonuniformity
and unobservability.  In  the next section  I con-
sider a number of practical issues that must be
addressed in the development of such MB pro-
grams,  issues  that  take  on  enormous  impor-
tance  as  we  move  from  the  textbook  to  the
world  of  laws  and  regulations.  I  close  my
comments  with  some  conclusions  and predic-
tions,  discussing  what  we  have  learned  from
the papers regarding the prospects for MB pol-
icies in  these three  areas.
Economic  Theory  vs.  Regulatory Reality
While  economists  were  the original  advocates
for  market-based  pollution  control  programs,
much  of  the  current  evolution  of  this  area  is
taking  place  in  a quite  different  environment
where  political  priorities  and regulatory  con-
straints  have more  importance  than cost  min-
imization  and  economic  efficiency.  As  we
move  from  the  textbook  to  the  real  world,  it
is essential  that economists  appreciate  the dif-
ferences  between  our  models  and  the  reality
of the  forces that  actually  determine  the  final
form that such programs  take.  I highlight  five
issues  that become critical  when we move  to-
ward  implementation,  and  discuss  how  these
papers  have  or  have  not  addressed  these  is-
sues.
Monitoring and Enforcement Issues-the
Legal Foundation of Transferable Rights
One of the essential  characteristics  of efficient
property  rights  is  that  they  are  enforceable.
For  a  right  (or  responsibility)  to  be  enforce-
able,  not  only  must  it  be  well  defined  but  it
must  also hold up  if challenged  in  court. The
current  papers  involve  trading  by  nonpoint
sources.  Defining  the rights  and  responsibili-
ties  for  such  agents  is not  an  easy  matter.  As
noted  by Randall  and Taylor,  economists have
come  up  with  a  number  of mechanisms  that
can be used to address the informational  prob-
lems  that arise  in the case  of nonpoint  pollu-
tion.  Joint  liability  as  proposed  by  Segerson
and other contract mechanisms  can, in theory,
lead  to  optimal  choices  over nonpoint  source
pollution.  However,  Randall and Taylor  go on
to note  that many  such  programs  may violate
"ordinary  notions  of fairness,"  making  them
unacceptable  from  a legal  perspective.  I spec-
ulate  that  the  tenuous  legal  foundation  for
these  mechanisms  is  the  primary  reason  that
they have  yet to  be  applied  by resource  man-
agers  (Shortle,  Horan  and  Abler).  As  Randall
and  Taylor  propose,  such  mechanisms  may
face  fewer problems  when used  to create pos-
itive  incentives.  Finding  ways  to  implement
such programs  is  an area that demands further
research.
The  alternative  to joint liability  is  to base
transferable  rights  on  practices  rather  than
standards.  This approach has a number of lim-
itations  of its  own.  The  focus of the  work by
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Morgan,  Coggins  and  Eidman  is  to  improve
the  predictability  of  the  relationship  between
practices  and  contamination.  Certainly  this is
an  important  concern  and  one  in  which  sub-
stantial  progress  can be made.  But it might be
that  the  black  box  of  a  complicated  model
might  actually  be  inferior  to  rules  of thumb.
If the model  shows that Farm A  must be held
to  a  substantial  higher  standard than  Farm  B,
will  the model  hold up  in court to legal  chal-
lenges?  Most models involve enough  assump-
tions  and guesswork to  make them  extremely
susceptible  to  scientific  criticism.  I  wonder
whether  regulatory  agencies  will  risk  their
time  and  resources  on  a  program  that  can  so
easily be toppled.
Ironically,  the issue with the greatest prob-
lems of monitoring and enforcement may have
the fewest problems  in this regard.  In the area
of carbon  sequestration,  monitoring  the actual
amount of carbon sequestered  is likely to be a
very difficult  exercise.  Zeuli  and Skees report
studies  that  have  found  carbon  sequestration
rates that vary by orders of magnitude. In this
case,  however,  it  is  not clear  that  the  uncer-
tainty  is that problematic,  for  all  that matters
is  that  the  total  amount  sequestered  is  suffi-
cient.  If Farmers  A  and  B  receive  50  credits
each, the total goal of  100 is achieved  as long
as  100 units are  sequestered,  regardless  of the
distribution  between  A  and B.  Of course  it is
important to get the average right for only then
will  the nation's  carbon  sequestration  goal be
achieved.  Moreover,  improved  accuracy  in
carbon sequestration  estimates  will make pos-
sible  more  precisely  established  incentives.
However,  to the extent that rates of carbon se-
questration  vary  for  reasons  that  are  largely
out of the  control of the farmer and unrelated
to practices,  little  may be gained by improve-
ments  in the scientific  estimates  of carbon  se-
questration.  Since  there  are  no  local  impacts
and actually quantifying actual sequestration  is
so  difficult,  a  program  that  seeks  to  achieve
the  average  without  too  much  concern  that
each  participant  is  paid for  his  or  her actual
sequestration  may  satisfy  legal  standards  as
well.
Stavins has argued that there are five levels
in the cycle of environmental  impacts at which
pollution  might  be  regulated:  (1)  inputs,  (2)
emissions,  (3)  ambient or concentration levels,
(4) exposure  and (5)  risk.  It would appear that
MB  policies  dealing  with  nonpoint  pollution
problems  have  little  choice  but  to regulate  at
the  first  level,  i.e.,  based  on  practices  rather
than  actual  flows.  This  is unfortunate.  While
movement  from  (2)  to  (5)  on  Stavins's  list
would  lead  to  marginal  improvements  in  the
correlation between the point of regulation and
the actual  regulatory  concern,  any  movement
away from (1) can yield substantial benefits of
a  very  different  kind.  As  Randall  and Taylor
point out, if pollution regulations  can be shift-
ed from practices to performance standards the
entrepreneurial energies  of agents  are liberated
and the result can be  substantial reductions  in
costs. Sometimes, simply informing the agents
that  a  standard  needs  to  be  reached  can  pro-
vide  the  necessary  incentives  to  reduce  pol-
lution.  For example,  following  a  preliminary
analysis  of  the  members  of the  Tar-Pamlico
Association,  80%  of  the  required  reduction
was  achieved  with  only  operational  changes
requiring  minimal capital  outlays (Green).
Randall  and  Taylor  go  on  to  suggest that
as producers achieve greater latitude regarding
their  ways  of  meeting  environmental  stan-
dards, innovation offsets as proposed by Porter
and van der Linde might actually be achieved,
meaning  that  the  net  cost  of being  regulated
could actually be negative.  While there is sub-
stantial debate  over whether  such offsets are a
regular feature  of our economy  (Palmer, Oates
and Portney),  it is clear that they cannot occur
in  a  standard  command  and  control  environ-
ment.
As  a  halfway  step,  some  gains  can  be
achieved  if improvements  in models  make  it
possible  to  quantify  environmental  flows  as-
sociated  with  a  broader  range  of  practices.
With this in  mind, therefore,  scientists  should
attempt  to  develop  models  that predict  flows
based on  as  wide  a range of practices  as pos-
sible. In Morgan,  Coggins and Eidman's mod-
el they plan to obtain very accurate predictions
regarding  only  two  land-use  policies.  I  think
more might be learned if we had less precision
regarding  a  wide  range  of practices.  If deci-
sion makers  have greater  flexibility  regarding
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how they respond  to market  pressure,  the ben-
efit of MB  policies can be markedly increased.
Trading Ratios
An issue  that is closely  related to  monitoring
and  enforcement  is  that  of trading  ratios.  At
the  most basic  level  a  trading ratio  is used  to
adjust  the  market  so  that  apples  are  in  fact
traded for apples.  For example,  in an effluent-
trading program proposed for the Long  Island
Sound,  a  separate  damage coefficient  was  es-
tablished  for  each of eight  regions  depending
upon  their  impacts  on  the  Sound  (Kearney
Inc.).  Based on  these  damage  coefficients,  36
distinct trading ratios  resulted  so that, in prin-
ciple,  any  trade  would  have  a  neutral  impact
on the water  quality.
As Randall  and Taylor note,  however,  trad-
ing ratios are routinely used in effluent trading
markets,  justified  not  only  on  the  need  to
equate damages from different sources  but be-
cause of the uncertainty  surrounding  nonpoint-
source  reductions  (Malik,  Letson  and Crutch-
field).  As they point out, if the  trading ratio is
excessive,  it  can  impede  trades  and,  in  their
words, violate the raison d'etre of the program
itself. Clearly,  trading ratios have the potential
to  seriously  hamper  the  ability  of markets  to
work. However,  there are numerous legitimate
reasons  for maintaining  a trading ratio greater
than  1:1.
First, one must recognize that like any pol-
icy change  the  move  to  a  MB  program  must
be  "sold"  to  major  stakeholder  groups.  The
cost-minimizing  objective  promoted by  econ-
omists  is  likely  to  be unattractive  to  environ-
mentalists.  Accordingly,  high  trading  ratios
are  often  promoted  as  an attractive  feature  of
the program  in  that  each  transaction  will  ac-
tually lead  to  an environmental  improvement.
Environmentalists  are thus  more likely to sup-
port such programs.  Of course,  there  is  an ef-
ficiency  cost for this political payoff, but such
inefficiencies  are  hardly  unique  to  MB  pro-
grams.  While  our  role  as  economists  is  to
point out  these  costs,  we  should  also be slow
to  criticize  policy  makers  for  whom  political
pressures  are  real  constraints on  policy.
A second point, and one which Randall  and
Taylor  discuss,  is  the  role  that  uncertainty
plays in determining  the optimal trading ratio.
Given the relative uncertainty  surrounding the
effectiveness  of nonpoint-source  abatement,  a
positive ratio  may  be optimal.  As  seen  in the
paper  by Morgan,  Coggins  and Eidman,  tech-
nological  innovations  and  scientific  research
can  reduce  the  uncertainty  surrounding  non-
point-source  impacts.  Along  the  same  lines,
Randall  and  Taylor  mention  similar  attempts
to improve  the scientific  basis  for trading  be-
ing  implemented  by  the  Army  Corps  of  En-
gineers  in  wetland  mitigation  banking  pro-
grams.  Nonetheless,  it can  be quite expensive
to obtain the precise information leading to the
"ideal"  ratio  so  that  each  trade  is  environ-
mentally  neutral.  Extending  the framework of
Malik,  Letson and Crutchfield,  it could easily
be shown that there is an efficient  level of in-
formation,  a  level  at  which  a  trading  ratio
greater  than  1:1  would  be retained.  In conver-
sations  with  one regulator,  it  is clear  that this
reasoning  is one reason why trading ratios  are
being  used  in Michigan's  state-wide pollution
trading  program  (pers.  comm.,  David Batche-
lor,  Michigan  Department  of  Environmental
Quality,  Aug.  18,  1999).
Baselines
MB  programs  involve  financial  incentives  to
individuals  for variations from a baseline level
of emissions or abatement:  e.g., farmers would
be  compensated  for  increasing  their  carbon
stock  or  decreasing  their pollution  or  would
pay for the right to increase their pollution. In
each  scenario,  therefore,  the establishment  of
the baseline  becomes  a  critical issue  in deter-
mining  the  impact of the  program.  For  econ-
omists,  this  is typically  thought to be a rather
unimportant  concern  since,  following  Coase,
we  do  not  expect  that  the  distribution  of  the
rights will affect the efficiency of the outcome.
Not surprisingly,  this simplistic result does not
hold  as  soon  as  some  of  the  restrictive  as-
sumptions  are relaxed  (Montero,  Stavins).
If the rules  for  the  establishment  of base-
lines are inappropriately  designed, there is po-
tential  for  moral  hazard  type  problems  as
agents  might profit from increasing their emis-
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sions  in  the  short run  in  order  to  be  paid to
reduce  them  later.  Furthermore,  as  Zeuli  and
Skees  point out,  a program  that rewards  'bad
performers'  and  leaves  "good  performers"
with no rewards  is unlikely  to gain much  sup-
port  among  either regulators  or stakeholders.
Randall  and Taylor  argue that MB policies
represent  a  way  to  overcome  what  Randall
calls "the isolation paradox"  in which the key
to  successful  resolution  of  problem  requires
finding  ways  for  disparate  interests  to  coin-
cide.  The  isolation  paradox  can  be overcome
by  programs  that seek  "a shared vision"  and,
therefore,  consensus  among  stakeholders.  The
level  at which baseline rights and responsibil-
ities  are  set  can  be  critical  to  achieving  such
consensus.  Stakeholders  often  have very clear
perceptions  as  to what is  and is not  a  fair al-
location of baseline rights  and responsibilities.
Even if it appears  on  the surface  that  an out-
come  is  "win-win,"  if some  parties  feel that
they  are  being  treated  unfairly  by  a  program
the prospects for  success  are  limited.
Setting baselines in a manner that does not
reward poor actors  is  critical  to having  a  po-
litically palatable program.  On the other hand,
the efficiency  of these programs  requires  that
there  be  an incentive  for  such  agents  to  par-
ticipate.  One  way  around  this  dilemma  is  to
set the baselines  based not on  actual practices
but  on  generally  acceptable  practices.  In  the
case  of  carbon  sequestration,  for  example,
farmers  with degraded  soil may be allowed to
obtain credits only once they have restored the
soil to a "normal"  condition while other farm-
ers  might  have  credits  immediately  available
for  sale  without any  further interventions.  Of
course,  setting  such thresholds  can  lead to in-
efficiencies  because  farmers  with  poor  soil
have,  on  the  margin,  no  incentive  to  restore
their  soil until they have reached the baseline.
However,  such  inefficiencies  may  be  neces-
sary  in  order  to  achieve  broad-based  support
for the program.
Of course  the primary role  of the baselines
is to ensure  that the environmental  policy  ob-
jective  is achieved.  In market-based  programs
the baseline reflects the point from which trad-
ing  will  begin.  Such  programs  are  typically
designed  so that even if trading does  not take
place the policy objective is reached.  As Zeuli
and  Skees  point  out,  if  baselines  allocations
are  set based  on  a  norm for  acceptable  prac-
tices, farmers  could be rewarded for measures
that they are already carrying out. Such credits
certainly  could not be  counted  in the national
accounts of carbon reductions and, as such, the
overall  baseline  would  have  to  be  adjusted
downward  accordingly.
Transaction Costs
Substantial  attention  has  been  paid  in  recent
years to the importance of transaction costs in
MB  policies  (Stavins,  Montero).  Zeuli  and
Skees'  comment regarding  the carbon  market
is equally  true  for  any  application  of market-
based  instruments:  searching  for  efficient  in-
stitutional  arrangements  that  reduce  transac-
tion  costs  and  share  the  risk  is  the  key  to
potential  success.  One way that such costs can
be  substantially  reduced  is  by having  central
clearinghouses  through  which  all  or  most
trades  are  made.  This is the approach  used in
the Tar-Pamlico case discussed by Randall and
Taylor.  Zeuli  and  Skees  argue  that  a  similar
system  would  make  sense  in  the  market  for
carbon  sequestration,  particularly  given  that
most of the potential participants are small pri-
vate  landowners.
When  informational costs are high because
of the nature  of the  site-specific  nature of the
permit,  there  may  be  no  alternative  but  for
trading to take place  via bilateral negotiations.
Atkinson  and  Tietenberg  show  that when  bi-
lateral  trading  takes  place  the  result  can  be
less-than-optimal trades taking place and lead-
ing  to substantially  less cost  savings  than are
predicted in standard models. Without any ref-
erence  to  actual  trading  cost,  they  find  that
cost  savings  under  bilateral  trading  are  only
50-60  percent  of  the  least-cost  benchmark.
Given these results, economists  should be cau-
tious in portraying  markets  as if they  are fric-
tionless  environments  in  which  buyers  and
sellers  can easily find each other. For example,
the  market  mechanism  proposed  by Morgan,
Coggins and Eidman in which an abstract auc-
tioneer responds instantaneously  to bids lead-
ing  to a  single price  for all agents  is substan-
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tially  cleaner  than  the  markets  that  are
currently  operating  or  under  development  in
the U.S.  Their results,  therefore,  may  give an
overly optimistic  picture  of the potential  sav-
ings  that could  be  achieved  through  MB  pol-
icies in this  context.
Risk and Uncertainty
Zeuli  and  Skees make  an important  point that
is  often  ignored  in  the  literature  on  market-
based  instruments:  the risk preferences  of par-
ticipants  in  such  a  market  will  play  a  major
role in determining whether they participate  or
not. Economists  should carefully watch the in-
surance instruments that these authors  discuss.
The  development  of  similar  instruments  for
other  environmental  disamenities  is  an  area
that needs  much  work.  There  are  many  prob-
lems  where  negative  externalities  arise  be-
cause  of  the  risky  environment  that  agents
face.  For example,  Babcock  shows  that nitro-
gen  applications,  on  the margin,  play  a more
important role  in risk reducing than they do in
enhancing  yield.  Hence,  it would  be quite  in-
teresting if the role  of risk could be built into
the farmer's responses in the model to be built
by Morgan  Coggins  and  Eidman.  Could  mar-
kets be developed that involve state contingent
payoffs?  If so,  it  may  be  possible  to  further
reduce  the  actual  costs  of  achieving  water
quality  goals.
Of course,  risk  and  uncertainty  are  issues
not  only  for  the  participants  in  the  markets,
but for the agencies  as well. Particularly  when
MB  policies  involve  transferring  abatement
credits from point sources to nonpoint sources,
each trade moves the pollution under the agen-
cy's  purview  to  a realm  of much  greater  un-
certainty.  As  discussed  above,  regulators
sometimes  respond  to  these  risks  by  placing
barriers  in  the  way  of  trades  in  the  form  of
high  trading  ratios.  Alternatively,  they  mini-
mize  their risk by requiring  excessive  report-
ing  and restricting trading to only those trades
that  pose  little  potential  risks.  As  we  seek  to
expand  the frontier of MB policies, we should
watch  carefully  for  ways  to  reduce  the  risk
exposure  of the regulatory  agency  as  well.
Conclusions  and Predictions
The  papers in this session consider the poten-
tial for market-based  policies in three relative-
ly  new  arenas:  nonpoint  pollution  to  surface
water,  nonpoint  pollution  to  groundwater  and
carbon  sequestration  by  agriculture  and  for-
estlands.  I conclude  with  my prognosis  about
the potential for success in each of these areas.
There  is  no  doubt  that  market-based  ap-
proaches  will  play  an  important  role  in  the
control  of  nonpoint-source  pollution.  Randall
and  Taylor  list programs  in  15  states  that  are
in  various  stages  of  development  or  imple-
mentation. Like the Fox River program started
nearly  20  years  ago,  some  of these  programs
will  probably  fail  (Apogee  Research).  How-
ever,  with the  growing  structure of rules gov-
erning such trading, and rapidly increasing  ex-
perience,  many  programs  will  persist  and
market-based  approaches  will  become  a  stan-
dard  instrument in  the policymaker's  toolbox.
Certainly,  as Randall and Taylor point out, the
process  of developing  these  programs  can  be
as  important  as  the  final  form  itself.  It  is
through  this process,  I believe,  that Randall's
isolation  paradox is  overcome.
There  is no  doubt,  as  Randall  and  Taylor
argue, that much could be gained by switching
to performance-based  trading  away from trad-
ing  based  on  practices.  As  a practical  matter,
however,  I  see progress in the form of greater
variability  in  acceptable  practices  as  more
likely  than moving  towards  the monitoring  of
actual  flows.  Keeping  in mind  the limitations
of  such  practice-based  approaches,  however,
regulations  should  include  an  explicit mecha-
nism  through  which  the  range  of  acceptable
practices  can  be expanded.  This would  create
an  incentive  for  nonpoint  sources  to  sponsor
research  that will  find  innovative  ways  to re-
duce their pollution and document the efficacy
of these  practices.  Land-grant  universities
should  see this line of research  as a service to
both  the  agricultural  sector  and  the  environ-
ment.
In  the  area  of groundwater  contamination,
I think there is also some potential for market-
based mechanisms.  Given the spatial variabil-
ity  in impacts  on  groundwater  systems,  there
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are  obvious  opportunities  to  reduce  the  costs
of cleaning  up  our  nation's  groundwater  sup-
plies. However,  I am not optimistic that it will
take  the form  proposed  by  Morgan,  Coggins
and  Eidman.  As  the  authors  have  shown,  the
modeling  complexity  required  for  a  single
simulated  environment  is extremely  complex,
data requirements  are  enormous  and the  sim-
plifications  that  must  be  made  are  extremely
restrictive.  When  we  venture  out of the  com-
puter  simulation  model  into  the  real  world  I
see  little  hope  for  actually  quantifying  each
farmer's  contamination  of a distant well.  Giv-
en  the  cost  and  complexity,  I  would  be  sur-
prised  if actual  trading  programs  are  able  to
adopt  such models  as  the foundation  for trad-
ing.
Even  if my  skepticism  proves  true,  how-
ever,  this does not mean that the authors'  mod-
elling effort will be wasted.  Once such a mod-
el  is  developed  it  can  be  used  to  study  the
potential  for  alternative  market  structures  that
might be more practicable.  The  authors might
gain some valuable insights  by comparing  the
theoretical optimum with simplistic systems in
which credits are calculated based on practices
and  trading  ratios  based  on  distance.  When
their modeling exercise is complete there is no
question  what  they  will  find-costs  are  re-
duced by the fictitious  trading  program.  They
need  to  then  take  the  next  step  and  look  at
realistic  ways  that markets  might  work to re-
solve groundwater  contamination focussing on
both  the  realities  of data  and  modeling  limi-
tations and the fact that markets will not work
as smoothly in the real world as they do inside
a  Pentium processor.
Finally,  will  MB  instruments  play  an  im-
portant role in the reduction of CO2 to control
the problem of global warming? It is important
here  to  note that trading  might  take  place  on
at  least  two  levels:  trading  between  nations
and  trading  within  nations.  Trading  between
nations  is written into  the Kyoto Protocol  and
it is very likely that we will  see trading taking
place  at that level. Zeuli  and Skees'  paper ad-
dresses  the  potential  for MB  policies  to play
a role within  the US with specific  attention to
southern agriculture.  As they note, initial steps
are  already  being  taken  in  this  area  and  2.8
million  metric  tons  of  carbon  credits  have
been  sold  to  a  Canadian  consortium.  If  the
U.S.  ever signs  the Kyoto Protocol,  it is likely
that  the demand  for  these credits  will  expand
greatly.
While  quantification  of sequestration cred-
its is a  substantial challenge,  because  the ben-
efits  of sequestration  are  uniformly dispersed
with  no  local  consequences  correct  quantifi-
cation is  not  as  critical  in this  market as  it is
in  the  water pollution  cases  discussed  in  the
other papers.  As  long  as  the formula  used  to
calculate  sequestration  is  correct  on  average,
the markets will achieve the sequestration goal
regardless  of  how  imprecise  the  measure
might be  at any  one location.  This gives  reg-
ulators  a  degree  of  flexibility  that  might  be
capitalized  on  to reduce transaction  costs and
increase  trading.
As  they point out, however,  the distinction
between  stocks  and flows is critical.  If a coal-
burning  utility  seeks  to  offset  its  CO2 emis-
sions  by paying a farmer  to increase the stock
of carbon  in  the  soil  in  one  year,  that  stock
must  be  permanently  bound.  The  farmer's
ability  to participate  next year is substantially
diminished.  Therefore,  it is unclear  how  long
agriculture can be an active participant in mar-
kets  for  carbon  sequestration  since  over  time
the opportunities  there  will be used up. Even-
tually,  the nation's  sources  of CO2 flows will
have  no choice  but to reduce  their output.
Zeuli  and  Skees  make  a  reasonable  case
that  Southern  agriculture  is  likely  to  benefit
from  such  a  market,  and  that  conversion  of
land  to  forestry  is most  likely  form  that  this
will take.  Given the evidence they  cite on the
motivations  behind  forestry  on  private  lands,
it seems  likely  that farmers  will be  willing to
convert  land  into  forest  for  relatively  small
levels  of compensation.  Again,  helping  such
markets to develop  could be a great service to
the agricultural  community.
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